In Little & Gorgeous Inc. v. Wild Tribe Screen Prints LLC, No. 5:23-CV-00533-MA-RBF (W.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2026), Texas Magistrate Judge Richard B. Farrer recommended that “a default judgment should be entered against individual Defendant Alyssa Trinidad”, stating: “Any lesser sanctions would not adequately punish Defendants in a manner proportionate to their continued pattern of intentional destruction of relevant evidence.”

Case Discussion and Judge’s Ruling

The dispute arose in a trademark infringement action brought by Little & Gorgeous Inc (“L&G”), which alleged that the defendants engaged in unlawful use of its marks and related unfair competition. During discovery, L&G sought communications between the defendants and various third parties, including competitors, that were directly relevant to the alleged infringement and damages. However, Trinidad initially responded that no such documents existed or otherwise objected to the requests, prompting L&G to file a motion to compel and raise concerns about possible spoliation.

Those concerns were well founded. Despite being explicitly ordered to preserve ESI and to explain her preservation efforts under oath, Trinidad admitted to “periodically clean[ing] [her] phone” and maintaining settings that automatically deleted messages every 30 days – even after her duty to preserve evidence had clearly begun. Her testimony confirmed that key communications with both co-defendants and third-party competitors had been lost as a result of these practices.

Applying FRCP Rule 37(e), Judge Farrer first evaluated whether the threshold requirements for spoliation sanctions were met. He found no dispute that relevant ESI existed, that it should have been preserved, that it was lost, and that it could not be restored or replaced. Judge Farrer emphasized that the duty to preserve arises when litigation is reasonably anticipated, noting that such duty “comes into being when the party has notice that the evidence is relevant to the litigation or should have known that the evidence may be relevant.” In this case, that duty arose no later than the filing of the complaint – and likely earlier – yet Trinidad continued deleting messages well beyond that point.

Judge Farrer also determined that the loss of evidence was not merely negligent but intentional. He observed that Trinidad’s conduct “go[es] beyond failure to take reasonable steps to preserve and allege[s] Defendants intentionally destroyed the ESI.” Judge Farrer further concluded that the destruction “could have been easily avoided,” underscoring that Trinidad failed to take even basic preservation measures once litigation was anticipated.

Because Rule 37(e)(2) permits severe sanctions only upon a finding of intent to deprive, Judge Farrer focused heavily on the defendants’ state of mind. Here, that intent was not inferred: it was effectively conceded. He found that the defendants “deleted intentionally for the purpose of covering up the alleged infringement” and even “admit to committing perjury in their declarations to justify the ongoing destruction of relevant ESI.” This finding of intentional misconduct placed the case squarely within the category of egregious spoliation warranting the harshest sanctions.

Judge Farrer then turned to the appropriate remedy. Under Rule 37(e), lesser sanctions may be imposed to cure prejudice, but litigation-ending sanctions (such as default judgment) require a showing of intent to deprive. He concluded that this heightened standard was satisfied and that the circumstances justified a “death penalty sanction.” In doing so, Judge Farrer emphasized that severe sanctions are appropriate where evidence destruction is “intentional, thorough, and unsuccessfully concealed.”

Even if a showing of prejudice had been required, Judge Farrer found it clearly present. The deleted communications went directly to key issues in the case, including liability, intent, and damages. As he explained, “[a] party suffers prejudice where it cannot present evidence essential to its underlying claim,” and here the destroyed evidence included communications about sales, profits, and alleged infringement activities. Without this evidence, L&G was deprived of critical proof necessary to fully present its claims.

Judge Farrer also rejected the notion that lesser sanctions would suffice. He reasoned that Trinidad’s repeated and intentional destruction of evidence demonstrated a pattern of misconduct that could not be adequately addressed through lesser measures. Quoting prior precedent, Judge Farrer stressed that “when a party not only fails to meet his obligation to preserve evidence, but does so intentionally… the sanction must be severe,” because allowing such conduct to go insufficiently punished would risk encouraging similar behavior by other litigants.

As a result, Judge Farrer recommended that “a default judgment should be entered against individual Defendant Alyssa Trinidad”, stating: “Any lesser sanctions would not adequately punish Defendants in a manner proportionate to their continued pattern of intentional destruction of relevant evidence.” He also “order[ed] that individual Defendant Trinidad be held jointly and severally liable for the recommended award of attorneys’ fees and expenses Plaintiff L&G incurred in filing and arguing the Motion for Spoliation and obtaining the requested discovery.”

So, what do you think? Do you agree that a default judgment should be entered against Trinidad here? Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Case opinion link courtesy of Minerva26, an Affinity partner of eDiscovery Today.

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